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1. Introduction
Cooperation is vital for the functioning of society,
and the organizations and communities that form its
fabric. Not surprisingly, cooperative behavior is the
focus of many studies across a wide range of scien-
tific disciplines, including psychology (Dawes 1980,
Dawes and Messick 2000), sociology (Marwell and
Ames 1979, 1980; Raub and Snijders 1997), economics
(Ledyard 1995, Fehr and Gächter 2000a, Fischbacher
and Gächter 2010), political science (Ostrom et al.
1992), and biology (Gardner and West 2004, West
et al. 2007). The key question in this literature is why
humans cooperate even in situations in which doing
so is not in line with their material self-interest.
Although cooperation is ubiquitous in social life
and an important topic for all kinds of economic inter-
action, field data rarely allow for a clean discrimi-
nation among competing theories. Because carefully
designed laboratory experiments do allow for such
rigorous comparisons, laboratory experiments have
provided numerous important insights into coop-
erative behavior, and the resulting rich literature
forms the basis of most of our knowledge on human
cooperation. Still, laboratory settings inevitably have
limitations that some argue may hinder the general-
ization of findings to situations beyond the context of
the lab (Levitt and List 2007, 2008). Subjects are often
volunteering students who thus constitute a nonran-
dom sample of the population at large. Also, they
generally have less familiarity with decision tasks in
the laboratory than with those in everyday life, no
opportunity to seek advice from friends or experts,
and they know that their behavior is examined in
detail.
From an economic perspective, another obvious
drawback to lab studies is that the financial stakes
employed tend to be relatively small. Even those
experiments that utilize relatively large payoffs do
not involve amounts in excess of a few hundred dol-
lars (e.g., Hoffman et al. 1996a, List and Cherry 2000,
Carpenter et al. 2005), giving rise to the question
to what extent findings will generalize to situations
of significant economic importance. One solution
is to perform experiments in low-income countries,
where small nominal amounts carry a larger value.
In the domain of social interaction, such experiments
are, for example, employed by Slonim and Roth
(1998), Cameron (1999), Fehr et al. (2002), Munier
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and Zaharia (2002), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2005),
and Kocher et al. (2008). Although this might appear
an ideal approach, it has its own drawbacks. Cul-
ture, for example, has been shown to play an impor-
tant role in social interaction (Henrich et al. 2001,
2004; Herrmann et al. 2008), making it difficult to
generalize findings from low-income countries.1 And
although the stakes in these experiments are larger
than commonly employed, they still rarely exceed a
few months’ wages.
In the current paper, we study cooperative behavior
using another source of data, namely the behavior of
contestants on the British television (TV) game show
Golden Balls. Although the game show setting is an
unusual environment, it has the benefit of employing
large and varying stakes. Furthermore, game shows
are markedly different from laboratory experiments in
terms of participant selection, scrutiny, and familiar-
ity of participants with the decision task. Combined
with the strict and well-defined rules, game shows
can therefore provide unique opportunities to inves-
tigate the robustness of existing laboratory findings.
Because game shows are often competitive in
nature and ask contestants to make risky or strate-
gic choices, is it not surprising that they have mostly
been used to study decision making under risk (e.g.,
Gertner 1993, Metrick 1995, Beetsma and Schotman
2001, Post et al. 2008) or strategic reasoning (e.g.,
Bennett and Hickman 1993, Berk et al. 1996, Tenorio
and Cason 2002). More recently, however, game
shows have also been used to study social interaction,
in particular discrimination (Levitt 2004, Antonovics
et al. 2005) and cooperative behavior (List 2004, 2006;
Belot et al. 2010; Oberholzer-Gee et al. 2010). The cur-
rent paper is in the latter category.
In the final stage of Golden Balls, contestants make
a choice on whether or not to cooperate in a vari-
ant of the famous prisoner’s dilemma. In particu-
lar, the two final contestants independently have to
decide whether they want to “split” or “steal” the
jackpot. If both contestants choose split, they share
the jackpot equally. If one chooses split and the other
chooses steal, the one who steals takes the jackpot
and the other gets nothing. If they both steal, both go
home empty-handed. On average, the jackpot is over
$20,000. The variation is large: from a few dollars to
about $175,000.
If we assume that each player only cares about
maximizing her immediate financial payoff, the
choice problem in Golden Balls can be labeled as a
1 Interestingly, though not generally acknowledged, this argument
at the same time questions the universal applicability of the many
findings from higher-income countries, including ours. We refer to
Henrich et al. (2010) for a discussion on this issue.
“weak” form of the prisoner’s dilemma.2 Where in
the classic form of the prisoner’s dilemma defecting
strictly dominates cooperating, here defecting only
weakly dominates cooperating: choosing steal always
does at least as well, and sometimes better than
choosing split. Of course, contestants may consider
other factors aside from their own monetary payoff
when deciding which choice to make. Much experi-
mental research suggests that people have social pref-
erences in the sense that the payoffs to others enter
their utility functions. For discussions, see, for exam-
ple, Fehr and Gächter (1998, 2000b), Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness and
Rabin (2002), Camerer (2003), Fehr and Gintis (2007),
and Cooper and Kagel (2009).
The fact that the show is aired on TV of course cre-
ates another set of rather special circumstances that
could affect our results, although there is little existing
theory to suggest what the effect of a large TV audi-
ence would be. One might argue that players would
not want to be seen as a “jerk” on national television
and so would be more likely to cooperate, but one
can also argue that a player would not want to been
seen as a “sucker” (or someone who cannot detect the
weakly dominant solution to a simple game) in pub-
lic.3 The public nature of the choice could also mag-
nify subtle features created by the fact that the game
is a weak form of the prisoner’s dilemma. Specifically,
if a player thinks that the other player will steal, she
might decide to split on the grounds that it costs her
nothing to appear “nice” on TV. These complications
do not render our results uninteresting, but do need
to be incorporated in any attempt to evaluate how our
results should be interpreted in the context of existing
theories and experimental findings on cooperation.
Although Golden Balls is unique in its format, the
show shares the prisoner’s dilemma element with
a few game shows from other countries including
Friend or Foe (United States, 2002–2003) and Deelt
ie ‘t of deelt ie ‘t niet? (English translation: Will He
Share or Not?; the Netherlands 2002). These two shows
have been studied in four different papers. List (2004,
2006) and Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2010) analyze data
from Friend or Foe, and Belot et al. (2010) use the
Dutch show. List (2004, 2006) focuses on the effects of
demographic variables such as gender, race, and age.
2 Rapoport (1988) introduced this terminology. For the sake of
brevity, we will simply use the term prisoner’s dilemma to refer to
the game studied here.
3 Most studies related to the issue of observability indicate that peo-
ple display more other-regarding behavior when they are or feel
more subject to public scrutiny (see, for example, Hoffman et al.
1996b, Rege and Telle 2004, Haley and Fessler 2005), but there is
also contradictory evidence (Dufwenberg and Muren 2006). Kerr
(1999) suggests that the effect depends on conditions related to
social expectations and sanctions.
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Studying the same game show, Oberholzer-Gee et al.
(2010) compare the behavior in the first season of the
show with later seasons in which the contestants have
had a chance to observe prior episodes. Finally, Belot
et al. (2010) find that making a promise to cooperate
prior to the decision is positively related to cooper-
ation if the promise was voluntary, but not if it has
been elicited by the host.
In this paper we replicate many of the earlier inves-
tigations but also undertake several novel analyses
that are possible because of some unique features in
the format of Golden Balls. The way the stakes are
determined and the very wide range they cover pro-
vide the basis for new insights into the effect of stakes
and context. The dynamic setting of the show enables
us to look at reciprocity in cooperative behavior and
also at the effect of earlier deceitful behavior.
In our sample, individual players on average coop-
erate 53% of the time. Although this rate is similar
to earlier findings from the experimental literature
(Dawes and Thaler 1988, Sally 1995), direct compar-
isons are hampered by systematic differences in the
stakes, the visibility of decisions, characteristics of the
subjects, and preceding opportunities for communica-
tion or other social interaction.
We find only limited support for the notion that
cooperation will decrease if the stakes get signifi-
cant. The cooperation rate is unusually high when
the stakes lie in the low range of our sample, per-
haps because contestants think that for so little money
(relatively speaking) they might as well cooperate in
public. Cooperation does decline with the stakes for
stakes below the median but plateaus at around 45%
for medium to large amounts.
The high cooperation rate for relatively small stakes
suggests that context can convert money amounts
that would normally be considered consequential or
“big” into amounts that are perceived to be small,
just “peanuts.” This idea is supported by our finding
that cooperation is not only based on the actual stakes
but also on what the jackpot potentially could have
been. This effect is especially pronounced for those
who appeared in the earlier episodes of the show and
had no or little opportunity to watch the show on TV
and learn what sizes are large or small in the context
of this game.
A special property of Golden Balls is the inter-
action that occurs among contestants prior to the
final. Utilizing the dynamic setting, we find evidence
that contestants show some tendency toward reci-
procity. Among contestants whose final opponent has
attempted to vote them off the show, the propensity
to cooperate is significantly lower. Contestants do not
appear to reciprocate against opponents who have
lied earlier in the game. Lying seems to be accepted
here, similar to bluffing in poker. A possible reason
for this is that, in contrast to a vote cast against some-
one, lying is a defensive act that is not aimed at any-
one in particular.
Surprisingly, we find little evidence that contes-
tants’ propensity to cooperate depends positively
on the likelihood that their opponent will cooper-
ate. Although an opponent’s promise to cooperate is
a strong predictor of her actual choice, contestants
appear not to be more likely to cooperate if their
opponent might be expected to cooperate. Our final
main result is that young males cooperate less than
young females. This difference decreases and even
reverses as age increases and men become increas-
ingly cooperative.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes
the game show in more detail, discusses our data, and
presents descriptive statistics. Sections 3–7 cover the
various possible factors behind cooperative behav-
ior included in our analysis. Each of these sections
provides related literature and other background,
explains the variables that we use, and discusses the
results of our probit regression analyses. Section 8
concludes.
2. Game Show and Data
2.1. Description of Golden Balls
The TV game show Golden Balls was developed by the
Dutch production company Endemol. Its debut was
on the ITV network in the United Kingdom in June
2007 and the show ran until December 2009. Each
episode consists of four rounds and starts with four
contestants, usually two men and two women.
In round 1, twelve golden balls are randomly
drawn from the “golden bank,” a lottery machine con-
taining one hundred “golden” balls. Each of these
balls has a hidden cash amount inside, ranging from
a minimum of £10 to a maximum of £75,000.4 Con-
testants know that this is the range for the amounts
in the balls, but they do not know the precise distri-
bution (though this becomes clearer over time as the
show is aired). At a later stage of the game, a subset of
the cash balls drawn will contribute to the final jack-
pot. Also, four balls hiding the word “killer” inside
are mixed with the twelve cash balls. Killer balls are
undesirable in a way we will explain below. From the
16 balls, each contestant receives four balls at random.
For each contestant, two are placed on the front row
with their contents—either a cash amount or the word
killer—openly displayed; the other two are placed on
the back row and their contents are known by the par-
ticular contestant alone. (Poker players can think of
4 Values in British pounds can be translated into U.S. dollars using
a rate of $1,75 per pound, an approximate average of the exchange
rate during the period in which the show ran.
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this as two “up” cards and two “down” cards.) The
contestants now have to decide by vote which player
will be kicked off the show. Because the balls of voted-
off contestants are removed from the game and the
remaining contestants’ balls matter for the ultimate
jackpot, there is a strong incentive to retain players
with high value balls and kick off players with low
value balls or killer balls.
Before the voting starts, each contestant publicly
announces the contents of the balls on her back
row (knowing that these values will subsequently be
revealed, but only after the vote). Then, the four con-
testants together have an open discussion in which
they can voice their evaluation of other players’ state-
ments and their opinion of who should be voted off.
Each player then anonymously casts a vote against
one specific opponent. After the votes are tallied, the
player who received the most votes leaves the game.5
Lastly, all the players reveal the values of their back
row balls, and differences between the actual values
and the previous claims are noted.
In round 2, two additional cash balls from the lot-
tery machine and one extra killer ball are added to
the twelve remaining balls from round 1. The 15 balls
are then randomly allocated to the three contestants.
Each of them receives two balls on her front row and
three on her (hidden) back row. Similar to round 1,
contestants make (cheap talk) statements on the balls
on their back row, a round of banter follows, votes are
cast anonymously and tallied, the player who receives
the most votes leaves the game, and all hidden ball
values are revealed.6 Two players and their 10 balls
proceed to round 3.
Round 3 determines the size of the final jackpot.
First, one additional killer ball is mixed with the
10 balls from round 2. Then five of the balls are
selected sequentially at random. If a ball selected is a
cash ball, its face value is added to the jackpot. If a
killer ball is drawn, the current cumulative jackpot is
divided by ten. For example, if the first two balls were
£50,000 and £1,000 and the third is a killer ball, the
level of the jackpot is reduced from £51,000 to £5,100.
A killer ball does not affect the jackpot contribution of
cash balls drawn thereafter. If the fourth and fifth ball
in our example were another killer ball and £25,000,
respectively, then the actual jackpot would be £25,510.
5 If two contestants receive two votes each, their opponents openly
discuss who they want to keep in the show. If they cannot decide,
a decision is made at random. If all four contestants receive one
vote each, contestants openly attempt to form a coalition against
one specific contestant. Again, if they cannot decide, a decision is
made at random.
6 The procedure in the case of a tie is similar to that in round 1. Tie-
breaking occurs by discussion or by random draw if no agreement
is reached.
Note that this round is a completely stochastic pro-
cess, and that contestants have full information on the
balls that are in play. Before the five balls are drawn,
special attention is always paid to the highest possi-
ble jackpot (that is, the sum of the five largest cash
values). This value and the number of killer balls are
explicitly stressed by the game show host.
After round 3 determines the jackpot, in the fourth
and final round the contestants play a variant of
the prisoner’s dilemma. Each contestant receives two
golden balls. One of the balls says “split” and the
other says “steal” on the inside. The contestants then
simultaneously have to decide which ball they want
to play. If both choose split, they share the jackpot
equally. If one chooses split and the other chooses
steal, the contestant who steals takes the whole jack-
pot and the other gets nothing. If they both choose
steal both go home empty-handed. Before each con-
testant makes her actual decision, a brief time period
is reserved for a discussion between the players in
which they can make nonbinding promises, ask about
intentions, or attempt to get assurances of cooperative
behavior. This is the final round of cheap talk. Impor-
tantly, the contestants have not met before the game
starts and have no opportunity before or during the
show to make any kind of collusive agreement.
A relevant question is how the contestants are
selected. A spokeswoman of Endemol informed us
that anyone can apply to be on Golden Balls by sub-
mitting a detailed application form. Shortlisted con-
testants are then invited to an audition in order to
determine their skills at playing the game, their char-
acter, and their suitability to appear on a TV show
such as Golden Balls. Producers watch tapings of these
auditions and put together shows such that, according
to the producers, “a good mix of characters” is repre-
sented on each show. Thus, although the contestants
are not a random sample of society, the selection pro-
cess does not seem to create any obvious confounds
with the analyses we conduct here.
2.2. Data and Descriptive Game Characteristics
We examine the split and steal decisions of 574 final
contestants appearing in 287 episodes aired between
June 2007 (when the show was introduced) and
December 2009. During this period, 288 episodes were
aired, and, at the time of writing, no further episodes
were aired thereafter. Recordings from the show and
additional information such as recording and air-
ing dates were kindly provided by Endemol’s local
production company, Endemol UK. The one missing
episode could not be supplied because it was not
present in their archives.7
7 Sixteen episodes in our data set feature returning contestants. In
12 of these, players who previously had lost in the final (opponents
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Table 1 Selected Game Show Characteristics
N Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max
Cash ball (overall) 41018 51653092 101478049 10000 11500000 751000000
Cash ball (round 3) 21257 61775015 121204039 10000 11600000 751000000
No. of killer balls (round 3) 287 3014 0090 1000 3000 6000
Potential jackpot (round 3) 287 511493008 311386069 51000000 411150000 1681100000
Jackpot 287 131416009 191182098 2085 41300000 1001150000
Decision (split = 1) 574 0053 0050 0000 1000 1000
Prize won 574 41850055 111821006 0000 38075 1001150000
Prize won if nonzero 303 91188082 151004052 1083 21175000 1001150000
Notes. This table shows selected characteristics for the British TV game show Golden Balls, extracted from our sample of 287 episodes. Cash ball 4overall 5
is the monetary value of a cash ball drawn from the lottery machine in the first or second round of the game. Cash ball 4round 35 is the monetary value of a
cash ball that is in play at the start of the third round. No. of killer balls 4round 35 describes the number of killer balls that are in play at the start of the third
round. Potential jackpot 4round 35 is the jackpot size that is attained during the third round if the best-case scenario would occur. Jackpot describes the actual
size of the jackpot. Decision is a contestant’s decision in the prisoner’s dilemma at the end of the show, with a value of 1 for split and 0 for steal. Prize won
4if nonzero5 records the take home prize for a contestant who made it to the final (if she did not leave empty-handed). All monetary values are in UK pounds
(£1000 ≈ $1075).
For each episode we collected data on the relevant
observables in the show, such as the hidden and vis-
ible ball values, statements made by contestants, the
votes, the jackpot size, and the decision to split or
steal at the end. Some variables were estimated based
on contestants’ physical appearance and on informa-
tion provided in the introductory talk and other con-
versations during the show.
Table 1 displays some descriptive characteristics of
the game. Cash balls drawn from the lottery machine
during the first two rounds have a mean value of
£5,654 and a median of £1,500. Clearly, the distribu-
tion is positively skewed. The mean value of the cash
balls taken to round 3 is £6,775, which is statistically
significantly greater than the average value of all cash
balls in the show, implying that the contestants are
successful in using their votes to keep high-value balls
in play and eliminate small ones. The average num-
ber of killer balls in the game at the start of round 3 is
3.14, significantly less than the 3.67 we would statis-
tically expect if voting was random. Contestants thus
also seem successful in eliminating killer balls from
the game. Unreported analyses of contestants’ voting
behavior clearly show that contestants indeed try to
vote off the opponents that have the worst set of balls
on their front row.
At the start of round 3, special attention is paid to
the highest possible jackpot. Dependent on the cash
balls and killer balls taken to this stage, this maximum
varies between £5,000 and £168,100, with a mean of
£51,493 and a median of £41,150. The actual jackpot
for which contestants play the prisoner’s dilemma
stole while they themselves chose to split) get a second chance.
In four episodes, unlucky players who had been voted off in the
first game round receive a second chance. We do not find that
returning contestants behave differently, and, unless stated other-
wise hereafter, excluding them from our analyses does not materi-
ally affect our results.
game is generally considerably smaller because of the
skewed distribution of cash ball values and the effect
of killer balls, but still has a mean size of £13,416 and
a median of £4,300. These amounts are many times
the amounts typically used in laboratory experiments
and also large sums relative to the median gross
weekly earnings of £397 in the United Kingdom in
April 2009 (Office for National Statistics 2009). About
half of the time, the jackpot in our show exceeds
three months of median UK earnings, and 21% of the
contestants decide over a jackpot that is even larger
than a median annual salary (the third quartile in
our sample is at £18,350). The stakes are also large
compared to the two other game shows employed
in earlier analyses of cooperative behavior: in Friend
or Foe, the average is about $3,500 (List 2004, 2006;
Oberholzer-Gee et al. 2010); for the Dutch show, Belot
et al. (2010) report a median of E1,683. The wide range
of the jackpot in our sample is caused by its ran-
dom construction, by the highly skewed distribution
of cash ball values, and by the effect of killer balls.
The largest jackpot was played for in an exhilarating
episode from March 2008; trainee accountant Sarah
stole the entire jackpot of £100,150 from collection
agent Stephen.8
For the jackpot to be awarded, at least one player
needs to cooperate. We find that 52.8% of the contes-
tants decide to split. Although this might seem high,
the rate is actually remarkably similar to earlier exper-
imental evidence (see, for example, Sally 1995). In
our sample, both players split the jackpot 31% of the
time, one splits while the other one steals occurs in
44% of the shows, and in the remaining 25% of the
shows both players steal. The efficiency rate in terms
of the percentage of jackpots that is actually awarded
8 A video clip of this episode is widely available on the Internet,
for example, through YouTube.
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thus amounts to 75%. The efficiency rate obtained by
dividing the sum of earnings across all episodes by
the sum of all jackpots is slightly lower at 72%. (The
difference in efficiency results from contestants’ lower
propensity to cooperate when the stakes are larger;
we explore this effect in detail later.) These simple
statistics are a first indication that contestants do not
condition their behavior on that of their opponent.
Given the average cooperation rate, we would expect
to observe (split, split) in 28% of the cases and (steal,
steal) 22% of the time if the individual decisions in
our sample were randomly matched. Although the
actual percentages are higher (31 and 25), the differ-
ences are relatively small considering that each pair
of contestants operates under highly similar condi-
tions (same jackpot, same potential jackpot, and many
shared unobserved conditions).
On average, a finalist goes home with £4,851, but
the median prize is only £39 because 47% of the con-
testants get nothing. The 303 contestants who end up
with a nonzero prize take home £9,189 on average,
with a median of £2,175. It is worth noting that would
we have run this show as an experiment ourselves,
the total costs in subject payoffs alone would have
been £2.8 million.
2.3. Modeling the Decision to Split or Steal
In the following sections, we will analyze the deci-
sions to split or steal the jackpot using a binary pro-
bit model. We assume that when people enter the
final round they have a latent propensity to split y∗,
where y∗ ∈ 4−15. Furthermore, we assume that
this latent propensity is a linear function of personal
demographic characteristics x and context character-
istics z, in the form y∗ = x′+ z′ + u, where  and
 are parameter vectors and u represents an unob-
served stochastic component. We do not observe the
latent propensity to split directly, but only the actual
decision y, where y = 1 if a contestant chooses split
and y = 0 if a contestant chooses steal. We impose the
observation criterion y = 14y∗ > 05, where 14 · 5 is the
indicator function taking the value of 1 if y∗ > 0 and
0 otherwise. Assuming that the stochastic component
has a standard normal distribution, or u ∼ N40115,
leads to the binary probit model of the form Pr4y =
1  x1z5 = ê4x′ + z′5, where ê4 · 5 is the standard
normal cumulative distribution function. Using this
framework we estimate the parameter vectors  and
 using maximum likelihood estimation. We allow
for the possibility that the decisions of contestants
within the same episode are correlated by performing
a clustering correction on the standard errors (see, for
example, Wooldridge 2003).
Because coefficients in a probit model do not have
an immediate intuitive economic meaning due to the
inherent nonlinearities, we will follow the common
approach of reporting marginal effects instead. More
specifically, the marginal effects we report apply to
the medians of the explanatory variables, with two
exceptions. To highlight some of the interaction effects
that we find in our data, we set Age to be 20 and
Transmissions (the number of times the show has aired
at the time of recording) to be 0. The resulting “rep-
resentative agent” is a 20-year-old white female with-
out higher education, who lives in a relatively small
town and plays the final of our game for a jackpot of
£4,300, which potentially could have been £41,150. For
dummy variables we consider the effect of a discrete
change from 0 to 1. As noted by Ai and Norton (2003),
the traditional way of calculating marginal effects and
their standard errors is not valid for interaction terms,
and we therefore apply the alternative method they
propose. For the sake of consistency, we report signifi-
cance levels that apply to the marginal effects, though
these levels do not differ materially from the signif-
icance levels for the original regression coefficients.
Original coefficients and their significance levels are
available from the authors upon request.
3. Demographic Characteristics
First, we investigate how various demographic char-
acteristics are related to the propensity to cooperate.
Our later analyses include these demographic vari-
ables as control variables.
In previous studies examining the relations be-
tween demographic characteristics and cooperative
behavior, most attention has been directed to gen-
der. Psychologists have a long history when it comes
to investigating the relation between gender and
behavior, and, over the past decade, economists have
become increasingly interested in gender effects as
well. The standard finding is that women act more
prosocially than males, but the reverse is also found.9
For contextual settings similar to ours, List (2004,
2006), Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2010), and Belot et al.
(2010) report that women are more cooperative than
men, although some results are only marginally
significant.
For other demographic characteristics, the exper-
imental findings are also mixed. Carpenter et al.
(2004), for example, run public good experiments with
symbolic but costly punishment in Bangkok and Ho
Chi Minh City. They find that in Bangkok males and
higher educated subjects contribute more, however
there is no significant age effect. The same experiment
9 One possible cause for the varying results is that males and
females respond differently to specific contextual settings of the
experiments (Croson and Gneezy 2009). For example, if women
are more risk averse than men, this may lead to different social
behavior in situations in which risk is involved (Eckel and
Grossman 2008).
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in Ho Chi Minh City, however, shows the opposite
findings: males and higher educated subjects cooper-
ate less and age increases cooperation. Gächter et al.
(2004) find no influence of background characteristics
in a one-shot public good experiment with Russian
subjects.
To add to this literature we will explore the effect
of various demographic characteristics on cooperative
behavior. We employ the following set of variables:
• Gender is a dummy variable indicating whether
a contestant is male (1) or female (0).
• Age is a continuous variable measuring the con-
testant’s age in years. In many instances the contes-
tant’s age is not explicitly mentioned during the show.
In these cases we estimate age on the basis of physical
appearance and other helpful information such as the
age of children.
• Race is a dummy variable indicating whether a
contestant is white (1) or nonwhite (0). We apply such
a broad distinction because the large majority of con-
testants are white.
• City and London are two dummy variables that
are constructed to distinguish contestants that live in
major urban areas from those that reside in more rural
surroundings. Contestants’ city or county of residence
is always an integral part of the introductory talk.
City indicates whether a contestant lives in a large
urban area (1) or not (0). We define a large urban
area as a conurbation with a population exceeding
250,000 inhabitants.10 For some contestants we only
know their region and not their exact town or city;
we then assume a small domicile. London indicates
whether a contestant lives inside (1) or outside (0) the
Greater London Urban Area.
• Education is a dummy variable for the level of
education and differentiates between those with at
least a bachelor degree (1) and those without (0). Play-
ers generally do not talk about their education during
the show. We therefore estimate a contestant’s level
of education on the basis of her occupation, which is
always explicitly mentioned when she is introduced,
and on the basis of other information given in talks.
Contestants who are currently enrolled in higher edu-
cation and people whose job title suggests work expe-
rience equivalent to the bachelor level or higher are
included in the higher education category. From the
information that we have about each contestant, the
proper binary values are generally clear.
10 For England and Wales, the population data and the definitions
of conurbations are taken from the UK Office for National Statis-
tics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk). Similar information for Scot-
land, Northern Ireland, and Ireland is from the General Register
Office for Scotland (http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk), the Northern
Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (http://www.nisra.gov.uk),
and the Central Statistics Office Ireland (http://www.cso.ie),
respectively.
• Student is a dummy variable indicating whether
the contestant currently is a higher education (under-
graduate or postgraduate) student (1) or not (0).
Estimates for Age and Education are based on the
independent judgments of three research assistants,
where each value is based on the assessments of
two of them. When the estimates for Education were
different, we decided on the most appropriate value
ourselves. For Age we took the mean of the two
judgments, and included our own assessment as a
third input if the values of the coders diverged more
than five years.
We have also attempted to collect data on contes-
tants’ marital status and the existence of children.
These topics were, however, not systematically dis-
cussed in the program and values would therefore
be unknown for the large majority of our contes-
tants. Table 2 summarizes all the variables that are
included in our analyses, including the demographic
characteristics.
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the regression results
for a model that includes demographic characteristics
only. To be able to distinguish both general gender
and age effects as well as a possible interaction effect,
the interaction of gender and age is also included.
The results show that, relative to our representative
20-year-old female agent, young males are 22 percent-
age points less likely to cooperate (p = 00002). In line
with past results by List (2004) and Carpenter et al.
(2008), this difference disappears when age increases.
The effect of age is significantly different for males
and females (p= 00001). Women do not become signif-
icantly more or less cooperative when age increases
(p= 00422). Men, on the other hand, do have a higher
propensity to cooperate as they are older: their coop-
eration rate increases by more than one percentage
point per year (p = 00000; untabulated).11 Contrary to
the two previous studies, we find that the gender
difference not only disappears as age increases, but
actually reverses; males become significantly more
likely to split from age 46 onward. Figure 1 displays
observed cooperation rates at different age levels for
both males, females, and aggregates, clearly depict-
ing an age effect for men. Further analyses show that
there is no evidence of a quadratic age effect, neither
for men nor for women. We have also experimented
with specifications where the (semi-) continuous age
variable is replaced by a set of dummy variables that
represent various age groups. The results are econom-
ically and statistically similar.
11 The effect of age for males could be related to increasing depen-
dence on others (van Lange et al. 1997), or to hormonal or neu-
rological changes as men grow older, but we are hesitant to draw
conclusions in these directions for we cannot exclude that a gener-
ational effect (van Lange et al. 1997, List 2004) or a wealth effect is
(partly) driving our finding.
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Table 2 Summary Statistics
Mean Std. dev. Min Median Max
Demographic characteristics
Age 36078 11076 18000 34040 73000
Gender (male = 1) 0047 0050 0000 0000 1000
Race (white = 1) 0092 0027 0000 1000 1000
City (large = 1) 0047 0050 0000 0000 1000
London (London = 1) 0014 0035 0000 0000 1000
Education (high = 1) 0034 0047 0000 0000 1000
Student (student = 1) 0009 0028 0000 0000 1000
Stakes and context
Actual stakes (log) 8019 2008 1005 8037 11051
Potential stakes (log) 10068 0060 8052 10062 12003
Transmissions 111068 74018 0000 109000 214000
Reciprocal preferences
Vote received from opp. (yes = 1) 0005 0022 0000 0000 1000
Expectational conditional cooperation
Promise (promise = 1) 0053 0050 0000 1000 1000
Past deceitful behavior
Lie round 1 (lie = 1) 0041 0049 0000 0000 1000
Lie round 2 (lie = 1) 0036 0048 0000 0000 1000
Lie cash ball round 1 (lie = 1) 0024 0042 0000 0000 1000
Lie cash ball round 2 (lie = 1) 0015 0036 0000 0000 1000
Lie killer ball round 1 (lie = 1) 0021 0041 0000 0000 1000
Lie killer ball round 2 (lie = 1) 0024 0043 0000 0000 1000
Notes. This table shows descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables
in our analyses of cooperative behavior based on the decisions of 574 con-
testants to either split or steal the jackpot in the prisoner’s dilemma at the
end of the British TV game show Golden Balls. Age is the contestant’s age
measured in years. Gender, Race, City, London, Education, and Student are
dummy variables taking the value of 1 if the contestant is male (Gender),
is white (Race), lives in a conurbation with a population exceeding 250,000
inhabitants (City), is a resident of the Greater London Urban Area (London),
has completed or is enrolled in higher education (bachelor degree or higher)
or has equivalent working experience (Education), or is a student (Student),
respectively. Actual stakes is the natural logarithm of the size of the jackpot
in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Potential stakes is the natural logarithm of
the highest possible jackpot at the start of the third round. Transmissions
expresses the number of episodes that was already aired when the current
episode was recorded in the studio. Vote received from opp. is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if the contestant’s final opponent has tried to
vote her off the program at an earlier stage of the game. Promise is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if the contestant explicitly promised her oppo-
nent to split (or not to steal) the jackpot. Lie round 1 4round 25 is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if the contestant has misrepresented her back
row balls—either by overstating a cash ball or by hiding a killer ball—in the
first (second) round. Lie cash 4killer5 ball round 1 4round 25 is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 if the contestant has overstated a cash ball
(hidden a killer ball) in the first (second) round. Standard deviations for the
two stakes variables and the transmissions variable are calculated across
episodes 4N = 2875 to avoid the effect of clusters at the episode level. All
monetary values are in UK pounds (£1000 ≈ $1075).
When it comes to race we find weak evidence
that whites are more likely (about 13 percentage
points) to cooperate than nonwhites (p = 00101; p <
0010 in the models discussed hereafter). List (2004,
2006) and Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2010) report a sim-
ilar pattern, yet in more conventional experiments
the reverse is often found (see, for example, Cox
et al. 1991). Because possible but unobservable wealth
Figure 1 Age and the Propensity to Cooperate for Males and Females

























Notes. This figure displays the relative frequency of contestants who decide
to split across various age intervals. Bars depict the percentage of coop-
erators within specific age brackets for males, females, and the aggregate,
respectively. For each category, the number of contestants is displayed at the
bottom of the bar.
effects could contribute to this result, it should be
interpreted with caution.
Higher educated contestants are about nine per-
centage points more cooperative (p= 00062), although
this effect is only marginally significant in the current
model and not consistently significant across the var-
ious regression models discussed hereafter (00041 <
p < 00070). Similar to the effect of race, the effect of
education could be spurious because of an unobserv-
able wealth effect.
Students are frequently used as subjects in exper-
iments, and the reliance on such a specific subject
pool is often criticized. Sears (1986), for example,
extensively describes how the use of student subjects
might produce misleading or mistaken conclusions
about social behavior. It is therefore interesting to
investigate whether there is evidence that students
behave differently from others, holding other observ-
able characteristics constant. This turns out not to
be the case. Controlling for demographics such as
age and education, our regression results yield no
indications of a different attitude toward cooperation
among students (p= 00888).12
None of the residence dummy variables have a
significant effect. Possibly, relatively small social dif-
ferences between urban and more rural areas in the
United Kingdom explain this null result.13
12 In a similar vein, van Lange et al. (1997) and Bellemare and
Kröger (2007) do not detect a difference, whereas Carpenter et al.
(2008) and Egas and Riedl (2008) do report a negative bias.
13 In experiments conducted in a region of Russia where there is a
large gap, Gächter and Herrmann (2011) do find that rural residents
are more cooperative than urban residents.
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Table 3 Binary Probit Regression Results [1/2]
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Demographic characteristics
Age 00002 (0.422) 00002 (0.345) 00003 (0.311) 00002 (0.352) 00002 (0.403)
Gender (male = 1) −00221 (0.002) −00241 (0.000) −00233 (0.001) −00236 (0.001) −00233 (0.001)
Race (white = 1) 00134 (0.101) 00143 (0.082) 00139 (0.091) 00142 (0.089) 00149 (0.065)
City (large = 1) −00039 (0.396) −00043 (0.359) −00045 (0.335) −00039 (0.405) −00036 (0.439)
London (London = 1) 00059 (0.402) 00066 (0.348) 00059 (0.400) 00054 (0.444) 00058 (0.406)
Education (high = 1) 00088 (0.062) 00093 (0.053) 00094 (0.050) 00094 (0.049) 00091 (0.058)
Student (student = 1) 00012 (0.888) −00002 (0.983) −00008 (0.923) −00013 (0.884) −00007 (0.933)
Age×Gender 00011 (0.001) 00010 (0.001) 00010 (0.001) 00011 (0.001) 00010 (0.001)
Stakes and context
Actual stakes (log) −00043 (0.000) −00048 (0.000) −00049 (0.000) −00048 (0.000)
Potential stakes (log) 00057 (0.139) 00174 (0.006)
Transmissions −00000 (0.722)
Potential stakes× Transmissions −00001 (0.037)
Second half (second = 1) 00030 (0.508)
Potential stakes× First half 00139 (0.005)
Potential stakes×Second half −00035 (0.543)
Wald 2 (df) 34.87 (8) 51.61 (9) 52.57 (10) 57.87 (12) 62.35 (12)
Log pseudo-likelihood −379078 −371055 −370042 −368029 −367051
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.064 0.067 0.072 0.074
N 574 574 574 574 574
Number of clusters 287 287 287 287 287
Notes. This table displays results from the probit regression analyses of contestants’ decisions to split (1) or steal (0) the jackpot in the prisoner’s dilemma
at the end of the British TV game show Golden Balls. First 4Second 5 half is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if less (more) than 50% of the episodes
in our sample were already aired when the current episode was recorded in the studio. Definitions of other variables are as in Table 2. For each explanatory
variable, the marginal effect is shown for a representative agent who takes the median value on all variables, except for Age and Transmissions, which are set
to 20 and 0, respectively. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the episode level; p-values are in parentheses.
4. Stakes and Context
Economists typically argue that behavior will con-
verge toward the prediction of rational self-interest
if the stakes increase (e.g., Rabin 1993, Telser 1995,
Levitt and List 2007). The evidence from lab and field
experiments is, however, not generally supportive of
this view. Except for the finding that people seem to
become more willing to accept relatively low offers
in ultimatum bargaining games when the stakes are
high, empirical research generally finds no evidence
that stake size affects behavior, even when the stakes
are increased up to several months’ wages.14
Given that the stakes in Golden Balls are widely
ranging and, on average, considerably larger than
in previous studies, the show provides an excellent
opportunity to reexamine the relation between coop-
eration and stakes. In addition, compared to earlier
game show studies on cooperation, an advantage of
Golden Balls is that the stakes are mainly built up by
a random process and not by contestants’ answers
14 See, for example, Hoffman et al. (1996a), Slonim and Roth (1998),
Cameron (1999), List and Cherry (2000, 2008), Fehr et al. (2002),
Munier and Zaharia (2002), Carpenter et al. (2005), Johansson-
Stenman et al. (2005), and Kocher et al. (2008). For TV game show
data, List (2004, 2006) and Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2010) also find
that cooperative behavior is practically invariant to the stakes. Belot
et al. (2010) report some counterintuitive evidence that cooperation
actually increases with stakes.
to trivia questions. The latter may lead to a spurious
correlation because the ability to answer trivia ques-
tions may be related to unobserved background char-
acteristics such as income, which in turn may well be
related to the propensity to cooperate.
The variable that we use in our regressions is
labeled Actual stakes and defined as the natural loga-
rithm of the size of the jackpot.
Model 2 in Table 3 displays the regression results
when the stakes are included. Clearly, cooperative
behavior in our show is sensitive to the amount that
is at stake. To illustrate this effect, Figure 2 depicts the
actual and estimated cooperation rates for different
stake levels. The fitted line based on our full regres-
sion model (Model 6 presented in Table 4) appears to
capture the pattern rather well. Cooperation is high
when the stakes are relatively small: For amounts
up to £500, people on average cooperate 73.4% of
the time. The rate drops to approximately 45% as the
stakes increase and remains relatively stable for the
largest amounts. An unreported test shows that we
cannot reject that the relation becomes essentially flat
for stakes larger than £1,500.
Although the absolute level of the stakes thus
appears to have some influence on the propensity
to cooperate, behavioral research suggests that peo-
ple do not always evaluate prospects just in absolute
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Figure 2 Stakes and the Propensity to Cooperate





























































Notes. This figure displays the relative frequency of contestants who decide to split across various stake intervals. Tick mark values represent the endpoints
of the intervals. Each bar depicts the percentage of cooperators within a specific stake bracket. The dashed line reflects the average cooperation rate across
our full sample, and the solid line connects the average estimate of the propensity to cooperate for each stake bracket. The estimates are computed using our
“full model,” which is Model 6 in Table 4. For each interval, the number of contestants is displayed at the bottom of the bar.
terms, but rather they sometimes use relative compar-
isons to determine subjective values. This way, what
comprises the context can strongly influence choices
(Kahneman et al. 1999). In choice tasks, for example,
one can increase the likelihood that a given option is
chosen by adding an alternative to the choice set that
is dominated by the given option but not by the other
alternatives available (Huber et al. 1982). Also, as a
consequence of the use of relative judgments, seem-
ingly irrelevant anchors can influence how people
value goods of various kinds (Green et al. 1998, Ariely
et al. 2003, Simonson and Drolet 2004), even (risky)
monetary prospects (Johnson and Schkade 1989).
For our purposes, the question of interest is
whether the game show influences the contestants’
perceptions of what constitutes “serious money.” Sup-
pose that some contestants decide that for serious
money they are willing to bear the reputational costs,
if any, of defecting on national TV, but if the stakes
are small, so-called peanuts, then they will just coop-
erate to look good. In this scenario, we would observe
the pattern of cooperation in our data: high cooper-
ation rates for low stakes and lower cooperation for
high stakes. The interesting point, however, is that the
“small” stakes on this show, several hundred pounds,
are quite large relative to most experiments. So even
when the contestants are playing for what seems to
be peanuts, these are big peanuts!
In Deal or No Deal, another game show that has
even larger stakes than Golden Balls, Post et al. (2008)
also find strong evidence of such a “big peanuts” phe-
nomenon. Namely, when unlucky contestants faced
decisions near the end of the show that were “merely”
for thousands of euros, they displayed little or no
risk aversion. In fact, some of their contestants made
risk-seeking choices in such situations. The authors
provide further evidence for this behavior in class-
room experiments designed to mimic the show at two
levels of stakes: “low” and “medium.” In the low
stakes treatment the average prize was E40 with a
maximum of E500, and in their medium stakes treat-
ment the average prize was E400 with a maximum of
E5,000. Although risk aversion increased with stakes
within each treatment, such an effect was not found
across treatments: Despite the very different money
amounts, risky choices were similar for the low and
medium stakes session. Choices in both conditions
were even remarkably similar to those made in the
actual TV show, despite the huge stakes used there
(average E400,000, maximum E5,000,000).
These results suggest that a context can convert a
sum of money that would normally be considered
consequential into perceived peanuts. In the Golden
Balls scenario, earlier expectations about the jackpot
size or a specific value from the game might operate
as an anchor or reference value by which the actual
size of the jackpot is evaluated.15 The most obvious
benchmark contestants may use seems to be the max-
imum possible jackpot at the beginning of round 3.
15 We intentionally do not use the term “reference point” in order
to avoid associations with prospect theory here, because we are
hesitant to translate the elements of prospect theory to preferences
in this game and to derive testable predictions.
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Though the expected jackpot size might be an alter-
native candidate, it is neither salient nor easily cal-
culated. In fact, even a rough assessment is rather
complicated, particularly because of the influence of
killer balls. The maximum potential jackpot, however,
is always visually displayed and explicitly stressed by
the game show host.
To test for such an effect, we include the variable
Potential stakes in our analyses, defined as the highest
possible jackpot at the start of round 3. As with the
actual stakes, we take the natural logarithm. Not sur-
prisingly, the actual and the potential stakes variable
are significantly correlated, but because of the effect of
killer balls and the skewed distribution of cash balls
the degree is rather limited; the Pearson correlation
coefficient is = 0030.
Model 3 in Table 3 shows the new results. The pos-
itive sign of the potential stakes coefficient is in line
with what we would expect, but the effect is statis-
tically insignificant for the entire sample 4p = 001395.
Interestingly, the effect becomes marginally significant
if we exclude the (returning) contestants who already
appeared in a previous episode of the show (p =
00066; untabulated). This gives rise to the idea that the
anchoring effect of the potential jackpot may decrease
over time as contestants become more familiar with
the show by watching it on TV. Prior shows will give
contestants an impression of expected payoffs, which
may help them to evaluate whether the stakes they
face themselves are high or low in the context of the
game and reduce the role of an episode-specific refer-
ence value such as the maximum possible jackpot size.
We explore the effect of experience by testing
whether the effect of the potential jackpot changes as
contestants have watched more episodes on TV. As a
(noisy) proxy for how many shows a contestant has
watched, we define the variable Transmissions as the
number of different episodes broadcast on TV prior to
the studio recording of the current episode. Model 4
in Table 3 displays the results. There is no signifi-
cant main effect of this variable 4p= 007225, indicating
that there is no evidence of a trend in the coopera-
tion rate over time. However, the interaction effect of
the number of transmissions and the potential stakes
is significantly negative 4p = 000375 and implies that
the anchoring effect of the maximum possible jack-
pot decreases by a 0.10 percentage point for each
previously aired episode. Controlling for this interac-
tion effect, the effect of the maximum potential jack-
pot is highly significant in the early episodes 4p =
000065, where doubling the maximum potential jack-
pot increases cooperation by more than 12 percentage
points.16
16 Because the potential stakes and the actual stakes are correlated,
the interaction of Potential stakes and Transmissions might pick up
The pattern of a pronounced effect of the potential
jackpot size in the earlier but not in the later shows
also becomes apparent if we include dummy vari-
ables that subdivide our sample. Model 5 in Table 3,
for example, uses a natural subdivision and employs
a dummy variable for the first 149 episodes (0–112
transmissions prior to the recordings) and for the
remaining 138 (149–214 prior transmissions). Clearly,
the effect is significant across the first half our data
4p= 000055 and insignificant thereafter 4p= 005435.
5. Reciprocal Preferences
Reciprocity refers to a tendency to repay kindness with
kindness and unkindness with unkindness. Recipro-
cal behavior in the field is generally embedded in
long-term social interaction, and reputation concerns
therefore form a plausible explanation for virtually
all instances where people reciprocate (Sobel 2005).
Reciprocal actions can sometimes also be explained by
preferences over outcome distributions, most notably
by a desire for equity or equality (Fehr and Schmidt
1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). Interestingly, lab-
oratory experiments in which such motivations are
controlled for have convincingly demonstrated that
people also have a real intrinsic preference for
reciprocity.17
Golden Balls provides a neat opportunity to investi-
gate the presence of reciprocal preferences outside of
the laboratory and for substantial stakes. In particu-
lar, in the first two rounds contestants cast votes to
determine who has to leave the show. Each vote car-
ries a significant weight because of the small number
of contestants, and voting against somebody can be
viewed as unkind, particularly when the other votes
were cast against other players. If people indeed have
reciprocal preferences, we would expect that a contes-
tant who makes it to the final in spite of her oppo-
nent’s vote against her, has a lower propensity to
cooperate.18
an effect of the interaction of Actual stakes and Transmissions. As
a robustness check, we have therefore also added the latter to
Model 4. The effect of this additional control variable is insignifi-
cant (p= 00573; untabulated), confirming our interpretation.
17 See, for example, Kahneman et al. (1986), Blount (1995), Brandts
and Solà (2001), Kagel and Wolfe (2001), McCabe et al. (2003),
Charness and Rabin (2002), Cox (2002, 2004), Falk et al. (2003, 2008),
Offerman (2002), Charness (2004), and de Quervain et al. (2004). For
theoretical accounts, see, for example, Rabin (1993), Levine (1998),
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006),
Cox et al. (2007), and Gul and Pesendorfer (2010).
18 Studying voting patterns in the internationally successful TV
game show The Weakest Link, both Levitt (2004) and Antonovics
et al. (2005) find evidence that people reciprocate against people
who voted against them in past rounds. However, because players
in this show have an incentive to vote off players that are more
likely to vote against them, they cannot rule out that this strategic
concern drives the effect.
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Table 4 Binary Probit Regression Results [2/2]
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Age 00002 (0.387) 00003 (0.283) 00002 (0.457) 00002 (0.372) 00002 (0.355)
Gender (male = 1) −00249 (0.001) −00292 (0.000) −00258 (0.001) −00252 (0.001) −00247 (0.001)
Race (white = 1) 00149 (0.079) 00162 (0.077) 00146 (0.078) 00147 (0.089) 00148 (0.083)
City (large = 1) −00034 (0.467) −00027 (0.552) −00035 (0.463) −00034 (0.463) −00037 (0.433)
London (London = 1) 00041 (0.565) 00039 (0.540) 00050 (0.501) 00042 (0.551) 00037 (0.597)
Education (high = 1) 00088 (0.068) 00089 (0.041) 00089 (0.067) 00089 (0.065) 00089 (0.066)
Student (student = 1) 00001 (0.988) −00025 (0.768) 00008 (0.924) −00002 (0.983) 00001 (0.988)
Age×Gender 00011 (0.000) 00008 (0.010) 00010 (0.009) 00011 (0.001) 00011 (0.001)
Actual stakes (log) −00050 (0.000) −00054 (0.000) −00052 (0.000) −00051 (0.000) −00052 (0.000)
Potential stakes (log) 00183 (0.004) 00174 (0.004) 00170 (0.006) 00180 (0.004) 00186 (0.004)
Transmissions −00000 (0.660) −00000 (0.106) −00000 (0.608) −00000 (0.584) −00000 (0.497)
Potential stakes× Transmissions −00001 (0.026) −00001 (0.022) −00001 (0.030) −00001 (0.025) −00001 (0.029)
Reciprocal preferences
Vote received from opp. (yes = 1) −00215 (0.019) −00237 (0.015) −00202 (0.020) −00214 (0.026) −00216 (0.025)
Exp. conditional cooperation
Promise (promise = 1) 00311 (0.000)
Promise opp. (promise = 1) −00080 (0.053)
Age opp. 00001 (0.732)
Gender opp. (male = 1) −00118 (0.140)
Race opp. (white = 1) −00026 (0.775)
City opp. (large = 1) 00051 (0.288)
London opp. (London = 1) 00027 (0.713)
Education opp. (high = 1) 00116 (0.017)
Student opp. (student = 1) 00069 (0.442)
Age opp.×Gender opp. 00004 (0.279)
Past deceitful behavior
Lie round 1 opp. (lie = 1) −00013 (0.782)
Lie round 2 opp. (lie = 1) −00027 (0.578)
Lie cash ball round 1 opp. (lie = 1) 00037 (0.491)
Lie cash ball round 2 opp. (lie = 1) −00064 (0.295)
Lie killer ball round 1 opp. (lie = 1) −00055 (0.330)
Lie killer ball round 2 opp. (lie = 1) 00007 (0.894)
Wald 2 (df) 59.65 (13) 98.03 (15) 62.40 (21) 59.19 (15) 62.72 (17)
Log pseudo-likelihood −365086 −343031 −359026 −365064 −364052
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.135 0.095 0.079 0.082
N 574 574 574 574 574
Number of clusters 287 287 287 287 287
Notes. This table displays results from the probit regression analyses of contestants’ decisions to split (1) or steal (0) the jackpot in the prisoner’s dilemma
at the end of the British TV game show Golden Balls. The opponent variables measure the demographic characteristics of the contestant’s opponent and are
defined similar to the contestant’s own demographic variables. Other definitions are as in previous tables.
Although the voting is anonymous, it is often
straightforward to deduce who has voted against
whom. If a contestant in round 1 (round 2) receives
three (two) votes it is obvious that all others have
voted against her and that she herself has voted
against the contestant who received one vote. For the
other possible distributions of votes, we can usually
deduce the individual votes from the banter preced-
ing the vote, or, in the case of a tie, from the discus-
sion following the vote. In the banter leading up to
a vote, contestants generally make abundantly clear
whom they intend to vote against (possibly out of
an attempt to coordinate voting with other contes-
tants). In the case of a tie, contestants openly discuss
who they want to leave the program; if it was not
already clear from the banter whom they had origi-
nally voted against, this post-vote discussion gener-
ally makes it apparent. This procedure allows us to
determine a contestant’s vote 95% of the time. For
various reasons it is much more difficult to determine
clear instances of someone going out of their way to
be nice to another player, so we limit our analysis to
negative rather than positive reciprocity.
Based on the voting information, we create a
dummy variable entitled Vote received from opponent,
taking the value of 1 if a contestant received a vote
from her final opponent and 0 otherwise. If we could
not establish whether a contestant received a vote
from her final opponent, she is assigned the value of 0
as well (exclusion of these cases does not change our
results). Because contestants who receive votes often
do not make it to the next round, relatively few con-
testants qualify: as displayed in Table 2, 5% (28 sub-
jects) of the final-round contestants received a vote
from their opponent.
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Model 6 in Table 4 includes the new dummy vari-
able. In line with the idea that people have reciprocal
preferences, the likelihood of a contestant to coop-
erate with her final opponent plummets by approx-
imately 21 percentage points if this opponent has
voted against her earlier in the game 4p = 000195.
There are, however, three alternative explanations for
such a behavioral pattern that are unrelated to a gen-
uine preference for reciprocity. Although we cannot
rule out that these alternative explanations explain
part of the effect, they do not appear particularly
strong.
First, the causality may not run from receiving a
vote to cooperativeness but the other way around:
players voting against contestants with a less cooper-
ative disposition. This would imply that cooperation
is also related to the number of votes received from
other players, which appears not to be the case 4p =
00231; untabulated).
Second, a contestant may like to match her oppo-
nent’s choice for reasons other than reciprocal con-
cerns and interpret the earlier vote against her as a
signal that her opponent dislikes her and will not
cooperate. However, her interpretation would gener-
ally not be legitimate: players do not cooperate less
with someone they voted against 4p = 00403; untabu-
lated). Moreover, the next section finds little support
for such expectational conditional cooperation.
Last, a contestant’s lower propensity to cooperate
with someone who voted against her may be out of
reputation concerns (“I am not to be messed with”)
instead of an intrinsic preference for reciprocity. How-
ever, when asked to explain their choice after the final
decisions, contestants never use this costless oppor-




There is considerable evidence that many people have
a preference for conditional cooperation, defined as
the desire to match the cooperation of others. In lab-
oratory and field experiments, about half of the sub-
jects are more willing to cooperate if others do so
as well (e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001, Frey and Meier
2004). Conditional cooperation can arise from recip-
rocal preferences, but also for other reasons. Social
norms or a desire for conformity might account for it,
and, especially in the laboratory, egalitarian motives
can often explain conditional cooperative behavior
because equality in payoffs generally only arises if
players coordinate on their level of cooperation, as is
also the case in our show.
Experimental studies typically investigate condi-
tional cooperation in settings where subjects have the
possibility to condition their behavior directly on the
behavior of others. In everyday life, such clear-cut
conditioning is usually not possible, especially in one-
shot situations. Conditional cooperation then has to
be based on expectations about the behavior of oth-
ers, and the degree of coordination would depend
on the predictive power of available information and
on whether and how this information is interpreted.
A natural question is whether conditional coopera-
tion can be observed when the conditioning is only
on an expectation of cooperation rather than on actual
cooperation.
In Golden Balls it is not possible for a contestant to
condition directly on her opponent’s behavior because
the two are playing a simultaneous move game.
However, we can investigate whether contestants
condition their behavior on factors that form reliable
predictors of their opponent’s behavior. That is, we
can investigate the joint hypothesis that players make
rational forecasts of their opponent’s behavior and
then condition their behavior on those expectations.
The first step in such an analysis is determin-
ing the factors that a contestant could use to form
an expectation about their opponent’s likelihood of
cooperation. One such factor is whether an oppo-
nent made a promise to split. Although the liter-
ature on conditional cooperation is rather recent,
literature investigating the role of communication,
and especially promises in social dilemma situations,
already pointed toward tendencies of conditional
cooperation. In a meta-analysis of prisoner-dilemma
experiments, Sally (1995), for example, finds that
cooperation occurs more often when the other player
makes an explicit though nonbinding promise that
she will cooperate. The combination of a preference
for conditional cooperation and a reluctance to lie
(e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg 2005, 2006; Gneezy
2005) can explain why promises have such an effect:
people like to cooperate if others do, and a promise
is a reliable signal of others’ behavior if they have a
reluctance to lie.
In the conversation prior to the decision to either
split or steal, many contestants explicitly promise to
split or otherwise make a definitive statement of their
intention to do so. Based on the statements made in
this small talk, we create a dummy variable labeled
Promise, indicating whether the contestant made an
explicit, unambiguous promise or announcement that
she will choose split (1) or not (0).19 As shown in
Table 2, about half (53%) of the contestants make such
19 If a contestant responds affirmative to a question whether she
will choose split or if she announces that she will not choose steal,
Promise takes the value of 1 as well. The value is 0 in all other
cases, including when people give the impression that they plan to
split but do not explicitly express themselves as such, when they
just refer to earlier intentions (for example, “I came here to split”),
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a promise. We investigate both whether observing a
promise is predictive of the cooperative behavior of
the contestant making the promise and whether a con-
testant conditions her behavior on whether or not her
opponent made a promise.
As shown in Model 7 in Table 4, a player’s promise
is a highly significant predictor of her propensity to
cooperate 4p= 000005. Those who make a promise are
about 31 percentage points more likely to cooperate.
In fact, an explicit promise is the single most reliable
predictor of whether someone will cooperate.20
Although a promise is a strong signal of cooper-
ation, contestants whose opponent made a promise
do not have a higher propensity to choose split. In
fact, as Model 7 also shows, if an opponent promises
to be cooperative, the other player even displays a
marginally significant decrease in the likelihood of
choosing split. Belot et al. (2010) obtain a similar
result.
An explicit promise is the strongest predictor of
cooperation, but, as we have previously shown,
there are also demographic factors that a contes-
tant could use to forecast cooperation. For example,
we have seen that young males cooperate less than
young females. However, inferences from this sort
of analysis have to be tentative because there could
be an additional confound if opponents have a taste
for cooperating with someone with particular demo-
graphic characteristics.
As Model 8 in Table 4 shows, we find little evi-
dence that contestants condition their behavior on
their opponents’ background characteristics. The only
weak evidence for conditional cooperation is that
people cooperate significantly more frequently with
higher educated opponents 4p= 000175, but education
is not a very strong predictor of behavior. If we assess
the joint significance of the various opponent back-
ground characteristics, we also find that they collec-
tively do not have a significant effect on cooperation.21
Analyzing the show Friend or Foe?, Oberholzer-Gee
et al. (2010) find no conditioning on opponent back-
ground characteristics in the first season, but they do
find it in later seasons. They interpret this as con-
ditional cooperation on the basis of learned expecta-
tions. We too have investigated whether conditioning
when they confine themselves to statements like “you can trust me”
and “I will not let you down,” and when they only express their
preference for a coordinated outcome (“I want us to split” and “I
do not want both of us to go home empty-handed”).
20 Of course, we do not interpret the promise as causing the coop-
eration. The direction of the causation could go the other way.
21 We also looked at more complex mechanisms related to the simi-
larity of the contestant’s own background characteristics and those
of her opponent, such as whether people cooperate more with those
who are more similar to them (“social-distance” effects). In our
data, there is no evidence of such behavior.
arises as more episodes were transmitted, but we find
no indication for such an effect.
As an alternative to the two models discussed
above, we also examined a two-step approach. We
first estimated each opponent’s propensity to cooper-
ate given her background characteristics and promise
behavior, and then added the estimated propensity of
opponents as an explanatory variable to our regres-
sion model. Again, we found no indication of condi-
tionally cooperative behavior.
In summary, we find no evidence of expectational
conditional cooperation. Apparently, either players
cannot or do not forecast the behavior of their oppo-
nents, or they do not have conditionally cooperative
preferences. Our evidence for reciprocal preferences
in the previous section hints that it is the former
rather than the latter interpretation that underlies this
result.
Belot et al. (2012) also provide evidence that pre-
dicting one’s opponent’s behavior is difficult. They
had subjects watch clips from the Dutch counterpart
to Golden Balls and asked them to assess the likeli-
hood of each contestant’s cooperation. Although the
estimated likelihood for cooperators was significantly
higher than for defectors, the difference was only
seven percentage points.
7. Past Deceitful Behavior
In this section, we investigate whether lies influ-
ence opponents’ willingness to cooperate. In the
early rounds of the show, contestants have numerous
opportunities to lie about the values on their hidden
balls, lies that are quickly revealed to everyone. These
lies can be consequential. If someone hides low value
and killer balls and in so doing manages to remain in
the game, she will have reduced the potential payoff
to the remaining contestants.
In the final, contestants might be less likely to coop-
erate with opponents who have lied, either out of
reciprocal concerns (e.g., Brandts and Charness 2003)
or because they interpret lying as evidence of a self-
interested nature and a sign of an imminent steal deci-
sion (e.g., van Lange and Kuhlman 1994). Thus, past
deceitful behavior is not a separate possible determi-
nant of cooperation, but rather a special case of either
reciprocity or conditional cooperation, or both.
We collected data on the statements made by con-
testants and the actual values of the balls that they
possessed, allowing us to specify various measures
for deceitful behavior. The analyses reported here are
restricted to the use of dummy variables. We have
also tried more complex, continuous variables for
lying, but these approaches yielded similar results.
We apply separate variables for each game round.
The general variables take the value of 1 if the con-
testant lied, irrespective of whether she overstated
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the monetary value of a cash ball or failed to dis-
close a killer ball. To distinguish between these two
types of lies, we also use specific variables for each
type separately. It is not obvious which type of lie
would be considered more objectionable. On the one
hand, lying about killers is much more harmful to
others than exaggerating the value of a cash ball,
and, assuming a preference to reciprocate, doing so
could then be expected to have a greater negative
effect on an opponent’s propensity to cooperate. On
the other hand, lying about killer balls might also
be more understandable, because killer balls have a
much greater impact on a contestant’s chances to be
voted off the show. Players may realize that nearly
everyone will fail to disclose a hidden killer ball, and
thus not be inclined to punish such behavior. Lying
about cash ball values might be more like gratuitous
lying and be viewed more harshly and, consequently,
have a greater effect on cooperation.
As shown in Table 2, lying is rather common on
the show: 41% of the contestants who made it to the
final lied about their back row balls in round 1, and
36% lied in round 2 (some did both). Furthermore,
in the first round, 24% overstated the value of a cash
ball, and 21% hid a killer ball (some did both). For
the second round, these figures are 15% and 24%,
respectively.22
Table 4 displays the regression results when
we add the general dummy variables (Model 9)
and the dummy variables that distinguish between
lying about killer balls and lying about cash balls
(Model 10). We find that past lies of an opponent
do not affect a contestant’s propensity to cooperate:
each of the six variables is insignificant 400295 < p <
008945. In addition to these simple tests, we also inves-
tigated whether lying is considered less fair and has
more impact the more it is unexpected or “abnormal”
given the circumstances, but again we found no sig-
nificant effect.23 Lying neither predicts a contestant’s
own cooperative behavior.24 One plausible interpreta-
22 Conditional on having at least one killer ball on their back row,
contestants hid a killer ball 50% (43%) of the time in round 1
(round 2).
23 We used a two-stage procedure to express the abnormality of a
lie. For each round, we estimated a regression model that explains a
contestant’s propensity to lie, given the ball values on her back row,
the ball values on her front row, and the rank of her front row balls
relative to those of the other players. For each final contestant, the
“abnormality” of a lie we then measured as the difference between
unity and this estimated lie propensity.
24 Such a relation might be expected if the propensity to be honest
and the propensity to cooperate are influenced by a similar prefer-
ence for “prosocial,” “kind,” or “fair” behavior. It has, for example,
been argued that the reluctance to lie is driven by guilt aversion
(Charness and Dufwenberg 2005, 2006; Gneezy 2005), and empir-
ical analysis suggests that guilt aversion is also a strong driving
force behind cooperative behavior (Dufwenberg et al. 2012).
tion of these results is that lying is seen as an inher-
ent part of Golden Balls and therefore unobjectionable
behavior, much as bluffing is considered in the game
of poker (Charness and Dufwenberg 2005).
8. Conclusions and Discussion
Golden Balls provides us with the possibility to exam-
ine cooperative behavior outside the conventional
context of the laboratory with large sums of money at
stake.
Our results provide support for the view that atti-
tudes are strongly influenced by context. We find
unusually high rates of cooperation when the luck of
the game reduces the stakes to merely a few hun-
dred pounds. Such amounts are tiny in the light of
the thousands and even tens of thousands the game
is often played for but would be considered very
large in any laboratory setting. In the early days
of the show, when the contestants have not had an
opportunity to watch the show on TV and are still
learning what kind of stakes are to be expected, coop-
eration rates appear to be influenced by the salient but
normatively irrelevant value representing the maxi-
mum they could have been playing for with a lucky
selection of balls. Over time, this effect vanishes, sug-
gesting that expectations about stakes become well
informed.
We label the tendency to be unusually coopera-
tive for what would normally be considered high
stakes a “big peanuts” result. Players seem to feel that
when making a choice about a few hundred dollars
when they might otherwise have been dividing tens
of thousands, they are playing for peanuts, and coop-
erate, perhaps thinking that it is not worth stealing for
what they perceive to be so little money. This finding
reinforces a similar result for risk taking behavior in
another game show, Deal or No Deal. In that context,
where the stakes were even higher, amounts of money
in the tens of thousands of dollars became perceived
as peanuts, because hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars had been on the line. These are very big peanuts
indeed.
Using the interaction that occurs among contestants
prior to the final, we also examined the effects that
past opposition and lying have on cooperation. Using
the votes we find evidence to support the view that
people have reciprocal preferences. Contestants are
less likely to cooperate if their opponent has tried to
vote them off the show at an earlier stage of the game.
Lying on the other hand has no significant effect.
We investigated several measures, but none was sig-
nificantly related to cooperation. Lying is evidently
not frowned upon in Golden Balls, perhaps because it
is expected. The different impact of opposition and
lying might be related to their different nature in this
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game. Voting is a directed and aggressive act toward
one specific contestant. Lying, on the other hand, is
an undirected and defensive act.
With Golden Balls we are also able to investigate an
interesting, expectational form of conditional cooper-
ation. Specifically, because explicit promises to coop-
erate are strong predictors of actual cooperation, we
can see whether players are more likely to cooperate
with someone who has made such a promise. We find
no evidence of such behavior. More generally, we find
that players do not appear to condition their choice of
whether to cooperate on factors that predict the coop-
eration likelihood of their opponent. Players may lack
the ability or ignore the possibility to reliably interpret
information about the expected behavior of others,
or they may not have a preference for matching the
other’s choice. Given our finding that people recipro-
cate votes against them, the former explanation seems
more likely. For situations beyond the context of our
game these results suggest that conditional coopera-
tion is not a very important phenomenon, at the least
when direct conditioning is not possible and people
would need to form expectations about the behavior
of others.
We conclude with some comments on the general-
izability of our results. There are three primary con-
cerns. First, selection procedures may have affected
the average cooperation rate in our study. Subjects
self-select into auditions, are then selected by the pro-
ducer, and during the game they themselves have the
opportunity to vote off opponents they would rather
not play the final with. For some demographic vari-
ables, selection may perhaps also have affected the
correlation with cooperation. Unfortunately, we can-
not substantiate our intuition that such effects are
negligible, nor could we have prevented them if they
would exist. Note, however, that selection procedures
are inevitable in any lab experiment or field setting.
Moreover, the subjects in our sample vary widely in
terms of their demographic characteristics and as a
group they seem to resemble a (middle-class)25 cross-
section of the general population more closely than
subjects in most conventional experiments.
Second, subjects’ behavior in a game show might
be influenced by what could be called “a drive to
win the contest.” However, an important but hard
to answer question would then be what “winning”
actually means in this context. After all, it seems like
a matter of personal social preferences whether win-
ning is equivalent to a successful stealing attempt or
to a successful coordination attempt.
25 For whatever reason, whether it is the interest in applying or
the preferences of the producers, contestants are rarely very rich or
very poor.
Last, our contestants are not strictly playing a one-
shot game. In the setting we study decisions are made
on national TV, under the scrutiny of a studio audi-
ence and millions of viewers. This undoubtedly influ-
ences the behavior we observe. However, we do not
feel that these special circumstances render our find-
ings less interesting or less predictive of behavior in
other settings. The truth is that every setting is, in
some way, special. Subjects in a laboratory experiment
know that their behavior is being scrutinized to some
extent as well. Field settings are also special; bargain-
ing over the price of a car or a house is different from
negotiating compensation with a new employer or the
division of household chores with a spouse. Although
it would be fascinating for researchers to be able to
surreptitiously study the outcomes of these sorts of
interactions from the “real world,” the researchers
would still only be able to speculate on how their
results would generalize to different real-world set-
tings. TV game shows offer a unique opportunity to
study theoretically interesting behavior at stakes that
are impossible to replicate in the lab. How the results
compare with other contexts will be determined by
future research.
In the absence of an ability to conduct such
surreptitious field experiments in many domains,
researchers are left with two alternatives: run experi-
ments in the lab or the field, or study naturally occur-
ring behavior in an interesting setting. This paper is
an example of the latter strategy. Although a game
show may seem like a strange environment, we think
it may be closer to the situations that occur in the
workplace than many other settings in which cooper-
ation has been studied. Coworkers often must choose
whether to cooperate, and their actions are often at
least semipublic.
Finally, the big peanuts phenomenon, perhaps the
most interesting finding in this paper, is one that does
not appear to depend in any important way on the
specific game show environment. As a U.S. senator
once famously said, “a billion here, a billion there,
pretty soon you’re talking real money.”26
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